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 GAINING ASSURANCES 
JULIA Y. LEE* 
   This Article explores alternative legal mechanisms for solving a type 
of coordination problem known as the Assurance Game. The traditional 
approach has been to focus on changing the expectations of the parties. This 
Article focuses on altering the underlying payoff structure—not through 
sanctions, but through risk-reducing mechanisms such as guarantees.  
   One type of risk-reducing mechanism is the conditional money-back 
guarantee. Conditional money-back guarantees operate in settings ranging 
from federal deposit insurance to daily deal websites such as Groupon and 
LivingSocial. In each of these, a promise is made to return an individual’s 
monetary contribution if an event or condition that depends on the actions of 
others is met. The condition may be (1) the reaching of a predetermined 
threshold, or (2) the happening of some event. This Article examines both 
types of conditional money-back guarantees and analyzes factors that may 
impact their effectiveness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Often, individuals act, or fail to act, based on predictions of how 
others will act. They continually make strategic decisions based on 
what they believe other people will do, whether it is to contribute to a 
cause, sell a falling stock, or invest in a new technology. In some 
situations, they will be better off if everyone else cooperates while they 
defect. In others, there are no gains to be had from defecting: the best 
result is if everyone cooperates. The former describes the well-known 
Prisoner’s Dilemma; the latter, the Assurance Game or Stag Hunt. The 
problem in both is one of information and trust (or lack thereof).  
Legal scholars have applied game theory to study how legal rules 
impact strategic behavior. The conventional paradigm assumes that  
(1) problems of cooperation, as represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
are solved by changing incentives through sanctions; and (2) problems 
of coordination, as represented by the Assurance Game, are solved by 
changing expectations, not incentives.1 A substantial body of 
scholarship has challenged the first assumption, demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness and counterproductivity of sanctions in correcting the 
problem of defection or free-riding in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.2 These 
scholars have argued that changing expectations—building trust and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions 
of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 618 (2010) (“The solution to 
coordination games does not lie in the alteration of incentives, but in the facilitation of 
accurate expectations of one another.”).  
 2. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles et al., Homo Reciprocans: A Research Initiative 
on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness, UMASS 
AMHERST 1–4 (June 7, 2007), http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/homo.pdf; Dan 
M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333–34 (2001) 
(citing Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic 
Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EURO. ECON. REV. 845, 845–46 (1998)); 
Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in 
Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 156–57 (1984). 
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increasing the perception that others are cooperating—can be far more 
effective in solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma.3  
However, the second assumption—that the solution to the 
Assurance Game lies in changing expectations expressively, rather than 
by altering underlying payoffs or incentives—largely has 
predominated.4 Although preplay communication, norms, and learning 
have been suggested as potential solutions to the coordination dilemma,5 
those solutions presuppose repeated interaction or the ability to identify 
the other players. In diffuse, anonymous, non-repeat-player settings—
settings where the transaction costs are prohibitively high—the focus 
has been on changing expectations by means of focal points.6 “Focal 
points” are environmental features that attract the mutual attention of 
the players and make salient one way of playing the game over others.7 
To date, legal scholars generally have approached the Assurance 
Game from the standpoint of law’s expressive function.8 Richard 
McAdams, for instance, has applied the focal point theory to 
coordination games, arguing that legal rules, by their mere expression, 
can serve as “focal point[s] around which individuals can coordinate 
their behavior.”9 Under this theory, when a legal rule is sufficiently 
 
 3. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community 
Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1516–18 (2002). 
 4. A notable exception is Lee Fennell’s discussion of locks, bribes, norms, 
and pacts as potential strategies for solving collective action problems. Lee Anne 
Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public 
Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 45–53 (2001).  
 5. Russell Cooper et al., Communication in Coordination Games, 107 Q.J. 
ECON. 739 (1992); George J. Mailath, Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons 
from Evolutionary Game Theory, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1348 (1998). 
 6. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, 
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 231–34 (2009). 
 7. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–67 (1960); see 
also McAdams, supra note 6, at 231–32.  
 8. See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 618; Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: 
A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 219 (2004); 
McAdams, supra note 6, at 233–34; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of 
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, A 
Focal Point Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 
79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory]. 
For articles dealing with law’s expressive function more generally, see, for example, 
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Jason 
Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 9. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1651. 
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publicized, it provides a salient focal point that allows individuals to 
predict the likely behavior of others.10 
This Article attempts to move beyond the expressive power of 
legal rules to explore an alternative means of solving coordination 
failures—the alteration of underlying payoffs or incentives. Law can 
change incentives in at least two ways: (1) through coercive, punitive 
sanctions; or (2) through risk-reducing mechanisms such as guarantees. 
I argue that because of the inherently different nature of the Assurance 
Game, mechanisms such as conditional money-back guarantees (MBGs) 
may be particularly apt. I do not seek to challenge the role, or even the 
primacy, of changing expectations through focal points and other 
expressive theories, but simply to broaden the existing discourse to 
include the adjustment of incentives. 
By conditional MBGs, I refer not to the ubiquitous product-quality 
money-back guarantee, but to guarantees that an individual’s monetary 
contribution will be returned if an event or condition that depends on 
the actions of others is met.11 The condition may be the reaching of a 
predetermined threshold condition or the happening of some event. I 
examine both types of conditional MBGs and analyze factors that may 
impact their effectiveness, including the excludability of the good, the 
public or private nature of the guarantor, and the guarantor’s credibility 
of commitment. 
By making it less risky to hunt stag if the other person does not do 
so, conditional MBGs fundamentally change the dynamics of the 
Assurance Game. They encourage individuals to move from the riskless 
hare-hunting equilibrium to the riskier, but more rewarding  
stag-hunting equilibrium by altering the underlying payoffs. By 
minimizing or removing downside risk and changing the payoffs, 
conditional MBGs thereby change expectations of what others will do. 
Rather than making the normative argument that these types of 
mechanisms should be adopted, this Article sets out a framework for 
understanding how and under what circumstances these mechanisms 
effectively operate.  
 Part I briefly summarizes the differences between the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and the Assurance Game. Those familiar with these games 
should skip to Part II. Part II discusses coordination mechanisms and 
examines two types of conditional MBGs: threshold and nonthreshold. 
 
 10. Id. at 1666. 
 11. This model also may be abstracted out as an assurance contract or 
conditional pledge. Because assurance contracts have been proposed chiefly in relation 
to the private provision of public goods, I have chosen to use the term “conditional 
money-back guarantee” to describe this model.  
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Part III analyzes factors that could influence the effectiveness of the 
conditional MBG, including the type of good and the characteristics of 
the guarantor. Part IV discusses larger implications, comparing the 
conditional MBG to two other mechanisms for solving the Assurance 
Game: focal points and sanctions. It then explores applications in other 
areas, including crowdfunding and the emergence of new payment 
technologies. 
I. PRISONER’S DILEMMA VS. ASSURANCE GAME 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Assurance Game have frequently 
been used to model collective action problems from a rational choice 
perspective.12 Theorists employ these “two-by-two” games to study 
strategic interaction between individuals who cannot communicate or 
“enter into binding agreements with one another.”13 Although the 
collective action setting involves many individuals, the interactions may 
nevertheless be reduced to two-person games for the purposes of 
analysis.14 I briefly summarize the differences between the two games 
in terms of the nature of the problem, analytical structure and payoffs, 
and proposed solutions.  
A. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been extensively applied to collective 
action problems in which every individual acts rationally to advance his 
or her own self-interest, yet the net result is collective (and ultimately 
individual) harm. In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson 
advanced the thesis that rational, self-interested individuals with a 
common interest will not act in furtherance of the interests of the group 
to which they belong.15 Instead, they will always free-ride on the 
contributions of others absent coercion or other incentives.16 The public 
goods problem and the tragedy of the commons exemplify this 
dilemma.17 Whereas public goods involve individual costs that generate 
 
 12. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 188 (1994).  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 31–32. 
 15. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965). 
 16. Id. at 2. 
 17. I discuss public goods in more detail in Part III. The “tragedy of the 
commons” refers to situations where individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete 
a common resource. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 
1244 (1968). 
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nonexcludable benefits shared by all, the tragedy of the commons 
involves individual benefits that result in collective costs.18 Both have 
been analyzed primarily as Prisoner’s Dilemmas, classic examples of 
which range from tax and environmental compliance to the dynamics of 
labor unions, plea bargaining, and pretrial discovery.19  
Following is a classic illustration of the dilemma with the attendant 
payoffs. Two prisoners have been arrested for a crime and placed in 
separate cells. The prosecutor suspects them of having committed a 
felony, but only has enough evidence to prove a misdemeanor. So, the 
prosecutor offers each prisoner the following deal: If you confess and 
the other stays silent, all charges against you will be dropped (payoff of 
0, as shown in Table 1) and your testimony will be used to ensure that 
the other prisoner gets the maximum penalty (payoff of -10). If both of 
you cooperate and stay silent, you will each face one year in prison for 
the misdemeanor (payoff of -1). If you both defect (confess), the judge 
will be urged to be lenient and give you each five years in prison 
(payoff of -5).20  
Hence, if both prisoners stay silent, they are better off than if 
neither of them do. However, each will be better off defecting 
regardless of what the other player does: “[I]f Player 2 cooperates, 
Player 1 is better off defecting [(payoff of 0)] . . . . If Player 2 defects, 
Player 1 is [again] better off defecting [(payoff of -5)] . . . .”21 
Defecting, then, becomes the strictly dominant strategy, though the end 
result is to make both worse off.22 Both prisoners receive a payoff of 
five years even though they could have received one year had they 
cooperated with one another. 
 
 18. Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 183, 188 (1998).  
 19. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 1519–20; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 
YALE L.J. 377, 386–87 (1998). 
 20. McAdams, supra note 6, at 215. 
 21. Id. at 215–16. 
 22. Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 
Q.J. ECON. 112, 122 (1967). 
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TABLE 1 
  Player 1 
 
 Cooperate  
(Keep Silent)
Defect 
(Confess) 
Player 2 
Cooperate  
(Keep Silent)
-1, -1 -10, 0 
Defect 
(Confess)
0, -10 -5, -5 
 
 
The suboptimal nature of this (-5, -5) outcome has been used to 
justify legal rules aimed at creating incentives not to defect.23 
Conventional theory holds that the imposition of sanctions is necessary 
to align selfish, though rational, individual interests with the collective 
interests of society.24 Laws and regulations change the payoffs so that 
defection is no longer the dominant strategy.25 However, a considerable 
body of social science research has since challenged this theory and cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions.26 These theorists have argued 
that rather than promoting cooperation, sanctions dissipate trust and 
increase the perception that others are not cooperating, thereby 
triggering further noncooperation.27  
B. Assurance Game 
The Stag Hunt, or Assurance Game, models a separate problem of 
strategic interaction—the problem of coordinating one’s actions with 
others in situations where everyone does best by cooperating, but 
otherwise should all defect.28 The players have common interests in that 
they achieve the best outcome if they coordinate their actions and match 
 
 23. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 188. To be clear, this (-5, -5) outcome is 
suboptimal from the perspective of the defendants. 
 24. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1518–19. 
 25. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1650. 
 26. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 162 (2000); Kahan, supra note 3, at 1516. 
 27. Kahan, supra note 3, at 1519. 
 28. Although the two are often equated, there are technical differences 
between the two games. In the Assurance Game, if one player decides to defect, that 
player is better off if the other player cooperates. In the Stag Hunt, each player prefers 
cooperating to defecting, but only if the other cooperates as well. See BAIRD ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 301, 315. 
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strategies. If the other person cooperates, there is little incentive to 
defect or free-ride.29 In this respect, the game is inherently different 
from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the dominant strategy is to defect 
no matter what the other player chooses to do.30  
As shown in Table 2, the Assurance Game payoff structure 
fundamentally differs from that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unlike the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players face the same binary choice and the 
same payoffs. Each has a choice of hunting stag (Strategy A) or hunting 
hare (Strategy B). Although a hare can be caught regardless of what the 
other hunter does, there is no chance of catching a stag alone. Both 
players have a common interest in catching stag (a better meal, hence a 
superior equilibrium, with a payoff of 4). However, neither player can 
be sure that the other will not act selfishly and go after the hare, in 
which case the player who hunts stag will starve (payoff of 0).31 
Hunting hare involves no such risk: the payoff is 3 regardless of what 
the other player chooses.32  
TABLE 2 
 
 
Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Assurance Game has no 
strictly dominant strategy: it involves two stable Nash equilibria—(4, 4) 
and (3, 3).33 If Player 2 hunts stag (i.e., cooperates), then Player 1 is 
better off hunting stag and receiving a payoff of 4, rather than 3. If 
Player 2 hunts hare (i.e., defects), it is better for Player 1 to hunt hare 
 
 29. See id. at 35–36; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 231–32 (1978); McAdams, supra note 6, at 220–21. 
 30. See BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE 1–4 (2004); Brian Skyrms, The Assurance Game, 75 PROC. & ADDRESSES 
AM. PHIL. ASS’N 31, 31–33 (2001). 
 31. Skyrms, supra note 30, at 32. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Sen, supra note 22, at 122. A “Nash equilibrium” is a set of strategies 
where no player has an incentive to choose a different strategy given the strategies of 
the other players. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 310. 
Player 1 
 
 Strategy A 
(Stag)
Strategy B 
(Hare)
Player 2 
Strategy A 
(Stag)
4, 4 0, 3 
Strategy B 
(Hare)
3, 0 3, 3 
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and receive a payoff of 3, rather than 0. Whether the outcome will be 
optimal (4, 4) or suboptimal (3, 3) depends on what each individual 
expects the other to do.34 A player’s willingness to hunt stag will 
depend on his assessment of the probability that the other player will 
defect and hunt hare. Because of the riskiness of hunting stag, both 
players could play it safe and hunt hare, thereby trapping them in the 
inferior equilibrium.35 Players in the Assurance Game fail to coordinate 
because they are unsure of what the other players will do, not because 
they wish to take advantage of the other players.36 It is fear of getting 
“suckered”—fear of being left in the lurch if the other person does not 
cooperate—that traps individuals in the inferior hunting hare 
equilibrium, though everyone would be better off hunting stag.37 The 
solution, according to conventional theory, is to get each of the players 
to expect that the other player will hunt stag.38 Mechanisms that can 
assure each player that the other will cooperate and hunt stag are thus 
central to solving the coordination dilemma.39  
II. COORDINATION MECHANISMS  
How can these assurances be fostered to the mutual benefit of the 
players and the greater good of society? Where transaction costs are 
low—such that there are few practical impediments to voluntary 
exchange and bargaining between the parties—communication, norms, 
and contracts provide the most obvious solutions.40 Communication, for 
instance, has been shown to significantly increase cooperative behavior 
 
 34. Sen, supra note 22, at 122.  
 35. McAdams, supra note 6, at 220; see also SCHELLING, supra note 29, at 
232 (“People can get trapped at an inefficient equilibrium, everyone waiting for the 
others to switch, nobody willing to be the first unless he has confidence that enough 
others will switch to make it worthwhile.”).  
 36. Gary Bornstein & Zohar Gilula, Between-Group Communication and 
Conflict Resolution in Assurance and Chicken Games, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 326, 331 
(2003); Runge, supra note 2, at 155 (coordination problems require “assurance in the 
face of uncertainty”). 
 37. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1171, 1171 (1986); see also Earl R. Brubaker, Free Ride, Free 
Revelation or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. & ECON. 147 (1975). 
 38. SCHELLING, supra note 29, at 232. 
 39. See id.; Mailath, supra note 5, at 1351 n.11; Skyrms, supra note 30, at 
32. 
 40. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1697 (1996); Daniel F. Spulber, Consumer Coordination in the Small and in the 
Large: Implications for Antitrust in Markets with Network Effects, 4 J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 207 (2008).  
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in a wide range of studies.41 Communication allows individuals to 
gather information about the choices others are likely to make, to 
commit to what they will do, and to persuade others to do the right 
thing.42 In addition, it builds trust and “create[s] or reinforce[s] a sense 
of group identity.”43 Social norms—informal systems of social 
consensus of what ought or ought not to be done—perform a similar 
function, “influenc[ing] the costs and benefits of particular choices” in 
repeat-player settings.44 Contracts seek to ensure that both parties will 
work to their mutual benefit by providing for legally enforceable 
damages in the event of breach.45 
A. Focal Points 
But, when parties cannot readily communicate or bargain in 
advance, what can effect this change of expectations? In The Strategy 
of Conflict, Thomas Schelling advanced one potential solution: focal 
points. Focal points are simply conspicuous, unique signals in the 
environment that are mutually recognized by the players, thereby 
coordinating their behavior.46 For instance, imagine that a husband and 
wife become separated in a department store. According to focal point 
theory, they would likely find one another if there were a conspicuous 
sign saying that all persons who become separated should meet at the 
information booth on the ground floor. This sign, according to 
Schelling, would serve as the focal point that could coordinate actions 
in the absence of communication.47  
Richard McAdams’s focal point theory of expressive law posits 
that legal rules guide behavior simply by changing expectations of how 
other people will behave.48 For instance, consider a pure coordination 
 
 41. See Bornstein & Gilula, supra note 36, at 337; Robyn M. Dawes et al., 
Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions about Other People’s Behavior in a 
Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (1977); 
Kollock, supra note 18, at 194. 
 42. Kollock, supra note 18, at 194. 
 43. Id.; see Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice 
Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
 44. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative 
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1997); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 
(1996). 
 45. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 12, at 56. 
 46. SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 57–58. 
 47. Id. at 66. 
 48. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory, supra note 8, at 1651. 
2012:1137 Gaining Assurances 1147 
dilemma: the decision of whether to drive on the left- or right-hand side 
of the road. To avoid a head-on collision, it is in the mutual interest of 
both drivers to drive on the same side of the street—i.e., to drive on the 
left if the other drives on the left, and to drive on the right if the other 
drives on the right. If the drivers cannot communicate in advance and 
no norm or convention has yet developed, focal points become 
instrumental. In this case, McAdams argues, a simple proclamation by 
the state saying, “drivers stay on the left,” even without the threat of 
sanctions, could easily solve the coordination problem and create a 
norm of drivers driving on the left.49 The legal proclamation serves as a 
focal point that guides expectations—each driver drives on the left 
because he expects the other to do so.50 
This Article contends that this change of expectations can be 
effected not only through focal points and other expressive theories of 
law,51 but also by changing underlying payoffs. In certain situations, a 
legal proclamation alone may be insufficient to change expectations. 
Where an individual faces the prospect of a quantifiable monetary loss, 
or where the challenges to achieving or maintaining cooperation are 
particularly high, mechanisms such as conditional MBGs may be more 
effective at solving the coordination dilemma. As demonstrated below, 
unlike sanctions, conditional MBGs counter the core problem of fear in 
the Assurance Game by reducing or eliminating the risk of losing one’s 
financial investment.  
B. Conditional MBGs 
I distinguish between two types of money-back guarantees: (1) 
product-quality, satisfaction-guaranteed MBGs; and (2) conditional 
MBGs. Product-quality, satisfaction-guaranteed MBGs are what we 
traditionally associate with MBGs in the consumer context. They 
simply guarantee that if a buyer is not fully satisfied with a product or 
service, she will receive a full refund of the purchase price.52 They 
perform a signaling function, “signal[ing] product quality . . . when 
 
 49. Id. at 1667–68. 
 50. Id. at 1668. 
 51. Other expressive theories include correlated equilibria and signaling 
theory. See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1043.  
 52. Scott Davis et al., Money Back Guarantees in Retailing: Matching 
Products to Consumer Tastes, 71 J. RETAILING 7, 8 (1995).  
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buyers cannot directly assess product quality before purchase.”53  
Mail-order businesses, for instance, have made frequent use of  
money-back guarantees to counter customers’ uncertainty about a 
product’s quality at the point of purchase.54 Second, by deferring 
finality of a purchase at point of sale, they reduce the risk associated 
with purchasing an unknown product.55 They are perhaps the 
prototypical antithesis of the old doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the 
buyer beware.”  
My focus is not on product-quality MBGs, but on the second 
type—conditional MBGs. These are MBGs that take effect if some 
predetermined event or condition that is dependent on the actions of 
others is met. I discuss two types of conditional MBGs: (1) threshold 
conditional MBGs—MBGs that are dependent on the reaching of some 
preset threshold condition, and (2) nonthreshold conditional MBGs—
MBGs that are dependent on the happening of some event. In Section 1, 
I introduce two examples of threshold conditional MBGs: (a) peer 
purchasing in the consumer context, and (b) best-efforts underwriting in 
the securities context. In Section 2, I discuss deposit insurance as a type 
of nonthreshold conditional MBG.  
1. THRESHOLD CONDITIONAL MBGS 
a. Peer purchasing 
In recent years, we have witnessed the rapid and dramatic growth 
of an intriguing phenomenon: group buying, or what I term “peer 
purchasing” in the spirit of Yochai Benkler’s apt phrase “peer 
production.”56 In a seminal article, Benkler coined the term to describe 
the then-emerging phenomenon of collaborative production systems. 
These were systems operating outside of traditional markets or 
managerial hierarchies that could coordinate the creative energy of 
large numbers of diffuse, individual agents into complex productive 
projects.57 I use the term “peer purchasing” to describe a similar 
phenomenon: the use of the Internet to coordinate the purchasing power 
 
 53. Sridhar Moorthy & Kannan Srinivasan, Signaling Quality with a  
Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs, 14 MARKETING SCI. 442, 442 
(1995). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 442–43. 
 56. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369, 376 (2002). 
 57. Id. at 376–77. 
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of large numbers of dispersed, autonomous agents for the purpose of 
obtaining volume discounts. 
The idea of allowing strangers to band together to purchase 
products and services at bulk prices is by no means novel. Trade 
associations and cooperative buying organizations (co-ops) formed to 
pool the purchasing power of participating business existed for 
centuries. In the 1920s, cooperative buying groups of small retail 
grocers and other businesses were formed to counter the purchasing 
power of large chain retailers.58  
The online intermediary model popular today made its initial, 
though short-lived debut in the late 1990s before dissolving during the 
dot-com crash of 2001. Mercata, MobShop, and other web-based 
group-buying companies allowed consumers to use their collective 
buying power to obtain lower prices on various consumer products 
listed on the companies’ sites.59 Instead of having a predetermined 
price, each item listed on the companies’ websites showed a maximum 
price and how many others had agreed to buy at that price. The larger 
the number of buyers during the limited purchase period, the greater 
the price drop for the customer.60  
In China, tuángòu (pronounced “twango”), or team buying, has 
become the latest shopping sensation. As of the first half of 2011, there 
were nearly 5000 tuángòu websites in existence.61 The sites have taken 
sundry forms, but in its original conception, tuángòu involved 
aggressive bargain hunters finding one another over the Internet, then 
agreeing to meet at a designated time and place to collectively pummel 
a discount out of a willing or unwilling storeowner.62 The idea quickly 
spread to online intermediary websites that negotiate discounts in 
 
 58. Andrew C. Selden, An Analysis of Cooperative Buying Associations—
Including New Concerns for Franchise Systems, 37 BUS. LAW. 1569, 1570 (1982). 
 59. See Dorte Toft, Shoppers Band Together on Mercata, IDG NEWS (May 
20, 1999, 8:57 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/19991008222307/http:// 
www.pcworld.com/pcwtoday/article/0,1510,11049,00.html; Laurie J. Flynn, 
MobShop, a Group-Buying Site, Drops Its Consumer Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/business/mobshop-a-group-
buying-site-drops-its-consumer-business.html. 
 60. See Bruce Gottlieb, Does Group-Shopping Work?, SLATE (July 26, 2001, 
3:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/briefing/articles/2000/07/does_groupshopping 
_work.html. 
 61. Tae-Hyung Kim et al., The Groupon Effect in China, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 3, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=2899.  
 62. See Simon Montlake, China’s Newest Shopping Craze: ‘Team Buying,’ 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0511/p01s01-woap.html.  
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advance in return for a fee of thirty to fifty percent of the whole deal, 
similar to the Groupon business model.63 In one variation of tuángòu, 
Air China introduced a promotional “V-Flight” in June 2011 that would 
only fly if enough people signed up to purchase a seat between June 1 
and June 15 on the popular microblogging site Sina.64 Purchasers were 
given the option of selecting their meal options as well as members of 
the cabin crew.65 
In the United States, “peer purchasing” has taken the form of daily 
deal websites featuring steep discounts on products and services in a 
given geographical region. An online intermediary such as Groupon or 
LivingSocial negotiates a discount with local businesses in advance of 
the deal in return for a promise that the discount will not be offered 
unless a certain minimum number of customers sign up.66 The model 
differs from early group-buying companies such as Mercata and 
MobShop, which focused on selling consumer goods such as personal 
electronics, software, DVDs, and sports equipment over the course of 
several weeks.67 Today’s generation of group-buying intermediaries 
tends to focus more on services and leisure activities within a given 
geographical region, with deals expiring within twenty-four hours. A 
typical deal might offer a $20 voucher that can be redeemed for $40 in 
value at a local restaurant, clothing store, or spa. The customer 
purchases the voucher online with a credit card and, if the threshold 
minimum number of purchasers is met, redeems it with the local 
merchant.68 If the minimum threshold is not met, the individual’s credit 
card is not charged and no one gets the deal of the day.69  
 
 63. See Xu Fang & Jason Cheung, Tuangou-Revitalizing the Service Sector 
and Stimulating Domestic Demand?, ACCENTURE INST. FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 1, 
http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-Tuangou-
Revitalizing-the-Service-Sector-and-Stimulating-Domestic-Demand.pdf (last visited Oct. 
5, 2012). 
 64. Chinese Airline’s Group-Buying Flight is Latest Example of ‘Tuangou 
Fever,’ INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-
advice/chinese-airlines-groupbuying-flight-is-latest-example-of-tangou-fever-
2293732.html. The flight took off on July 1, 2011, the first of its kind. See Air China’s 
First V-Flight Airborne, AIR CHINA NEWS CENTER (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.airchinagroup.com/en/news/07/203233.shtml.  
 65. Id.  
 66. See, e.g., FAQ, GROUPON, http://www.groupon.com/faq (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2012); Terms and Conditions, LIVINGSOCIAL, https://www.livingsocial.com/ 
terms (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 67. See Gottlieb, supra note 60. 
 68. See FAQ, supra note 66. 
 69. Id. Because the credit card is not charged until the deal “tips,” Groupon’s 
model also could be characterized as a conditional pledge. However, for purposes of 
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The conditional component of the peer purchasing model reduces 
risk for both consumers and retailers. For retailers, it reduces risk 
because the discounts can be offset by the quantity of goods or services 
sold—the vouchers would, in effect, serve as quantity discounts in 
addition to a form of advertising.70 For consumers, the group buying 
model reduces risk because a consumer’s credit card is not charged 
until the deal has “tipped,” or reached the minimum threshold. 
Consumers can purchase the product or service with little to no risk of 
monetary loss,71 thereby increasing their willingness to buy into the 
deal.  
Imagine a variant of Groupon, Gambleon. Gambleon operates in 
exactly the same manner as Groupon, with one notable difference: 
consumers buy into the deal without a guarantee that they will not be 
charged if the threshold condition is not met. For instance, the 
consumer buys a $10 voucher for $40 worth of value and hopes that 
there will be enough other takers that the deal will go forward. If not, 
the consumer will lose $10. Why would any consumer take such a 
gamble?  
Reducing the decision to a two-person, two-by-two game yields a 
classic Assurance Game. There are two equilibria, one preferable to the 
other, but the players’ rational decisions may not lead to the preferred 
equilibrium. The best outcome would be for both Player 1 and Player 2 
to cooperate by buying the coupon voucher. The worst outcome would 
be for one player to buy, while the other defects by not buying. 
Because the efficacy of the coupon depends on both players signing up, 
the player who buys the coupon when the other player does not loses 
his investment of $10. Neither player wishes to be the one “suckered,” 
so both could refrain from buying the coupon (0, 0). The players defect 
not out of a desire to take advantage of the other player, but out of fear 
that the other player will defect. 
 
the issues addressed in this Article, conditional MBGs and conditional pledges are 
functionally the same. 
 70. However, retailers would continue to face the risk that the deals would 
attract mostly bargain hunters who do not spend more than the coupon’s face value and 
do not become repeat customers. 
 71. Consumers, of course, could lose out by neglecting to use their voucher 
after purchase, but this would be a loss within their control. 
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TABLE 3 
  
 Player 2 
  B 
(Buy)
N 
(Not Buy) 
Player 1 
B (Buy) 30, 30 -10, 0 
N (Not Buy) 0, -10 0, 0 
 
To establish the conclusion stated above, Table 3 displays the 
payoffs. It is easy to see how the one-shot game with two rational,  
self-interested players can end at the (0, 0) payoff instead of the more 
advantageous (30, 30) payoff. Let p be Player 1’s assessment of the 
probability that Player 2 cooperates (buys the voucher). If Player 1 
buys the voucher, he gets $40 of value with probability p at a cost of 
$10. His expected gain therefore is 40p - 10.72 If he does not buy, his 
gain is $0. A risk-neutral Player 1 will buy the voucher as long as  
40p -10 > 0, or p > 1/4. The same is true for Player 2. Both must 
believe that the other has at least a twenty-five percent probability of 
cooperating (buying the voucher) to achieve the optimal outcome.  
Mechanisms such as conditional MBGs provide the assurance 
necessary to move the players from the suboptimal (0, 0) to the optimal 
(30, 30) equilibrium point, even when they doubt that the other player 
is likely to cooperate. Groupon, LivingSocial, and other online 
intermediaries achieve the same effect by guaranteeing that the 
customer’s credit card will not be charged until the threshold condition 
is reached. With the conditional MBG, if Player 1 buys the coupon 
while Player 2 does not, Player 1’s payoff is 0 rather than -10. 
Similarly, if Player 2 buys the coupon while Player 1 does not, Player 
2’s payoff is 0 rather than -10. The conditional MBG alters the 
underlying payoffs so that it is no longer an Assurance Game. For both 
players, the clear choice, as shown in Table 4, is to buy the voucher, 
with a (30, 30) payoff.  
 
 72. If p is the probability that Player 2 buys, (1-p) is the probability that 
Player 2 does not buy. Player 1’s expected payoff for buying equals 30(p) + (1-p)(-10) 
= 40p-10. Player 1’s expected payoff of not buying equals 0(p) + (1-p)(0) = 0.  
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TABLE 4 
  Player 2 
  B (Buy) N (Not Buy) 
Player 1 
B (Buy) 30, 30 0, 0 
N (Not Buy) 0, 0 0, 0 
 
b. Best-efforts underwriting 
The threshold conditional MBG model also has been implemented 
in the securities context. Companies engaged in a public offering of 
their securities may undertake either a firm commitment or a  
best-efforts underwriting. In a firm commitment underwriting, the 
underwriter purchases the securities from the issuer, then sells them to 
the public, thereby assuming the risks of the offering.73 In a best-efforts 
underwriting, the underwriter simply pledges to use its best efforts to 
sell the securities, but does not purchase them.74 Best-efforts 
underwritings may take various forms. In a conditional “mini/max” 
best-efforts underwriting, a preset minimum number of shares must be 
sold during a limited time period before an offering of securities can be 
completed.75 If the underwriter does not succeed in selling the minimum 
number of shares, the deal does not go forward and the funds are 
returned to the investor.76 In an “all-or-none” best-efforts underwriting, 
if the underwriter fails to sell all of the securities in the offering in the 
required time, the funds are returned.77 By contrast, the “straight”  
best-efforts offering does not incorporate the conditional threshold 
aspects of the “mini/max” or “all-or-none” offerings. Any securities 
 
 73. See Craig G. Dunbar, The Choice between Firm-Commitment and 
Best-Efforts Offering Methods in IPOs: The Effect of Unsuccessful Offers, 7 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 60, 60 (1998), available at http://www.ivey.uwo.ca/faculty/CDunbar/ 
my_papers/withdrawn_IPO.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1561 n.42 (1989); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 752 n.19 (1985). 
 74. Dunbar, supra note 73, at 60–61. 
 75. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 120 (6th ed. 2009); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 85 n.11 (5th ed. 2004).  
 76. See COX ET AL., supra note 75, at 120. 
 77. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 75, at 85 n.11. 
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sold by the underwriter are considered sold; there is no money-back 
guarantee component.78 
Both the “mini/max” and “all-or-none” best-efforts offerings 
incorporate the conditional threshold MBG concept as a means of 
countering risk. While large, established issuers have little trouble 
finding underwriters to assume the risk of distribution and engage in 
firm commitment underwritings, newer, more obscure companies enjoy 
no such luxury.79 Take the case of an innovative, new electric car 
company that needs to raise at least $100 million in order to purchase 
the requisite machinery and raw materials to begin production. Not 
only would underwriters most likely be unwilling to purchase the shares 
directly from the company and assume the risk of a failed distribution, 
but investors also could be skittish. An investor considering an 
investment of $100 would want to part with his funds only if enough 
other investors come in so that the $100 million is raised. If only $50 
million is raised, the company cannot purchase the state-of-the-art 
technology necessary to manufacture the cars, and the investor loses his 
$100 investment.  
If structured as a straight best-efforts offering, the investors face 
an Assurance Game. As shown in Table 5, although everyone would be 
better off if the $100 million is raised (20, 20), representing a twenty 
percent return on the $100 investment, no one investor wishes to take 
the risk that enough others will not invest. If Investor 1 chooses to buy 
the shares, but Investor 2 does not, Investor 1 will lose his $100 
investment (-100, 0). Because of the fear that the other investor will not 
cooperate and buy the shares, each investor may choose to play it safe 
and refrain from buying the shares (0, 0), a stable but value-decreasing 
equilibrium.80  
TABLE 5 
  Investor 2 
  B (Buy) N (Not Buy) 
Investor 1 
B (Buy) 20, 20 -100, 0 
N (Not Buy) 0, -100 0, 0 
 
 
 78. See COX ET AL., supra note 75, at 120. 
 79. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 76, at 85.  
 80. Both investors must believe that the other has at least an 83.33% 
probability of buying the shares in order to reach the optimal (20, 20) equilibrium. 
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The conditional MBG component of the “mini/max” and  
“all-or-none” best-efforts offerings effectively solve the dilemma. As 
shown in Table 6, the conditional MBG removes the element of risk: 
each investor no longer faces the risk that he will lose his investment if 
enough other investors do not purchase shares in the offering. If 
Investor 1 purchases the shares while Investor 2 does not, Investor 2’s 
payoff becomes (0) rather than (-100). The dominant equilibrium is to 
purchase the shares, with a payoff of (20, 20).  
TABLE 6 
  Investor 2 
  B (Buy) N (Not Buy) 
Investor 1 
B (Buy) 20, 20 0, 0 
N (Not Buy) 0, 0 0, 0 
 
“Mini/max” and “all-or-none” best-efforts offerings present 
instances of private sector innovation by contract. Perhaps recognizing 
the difficulties faced by new or obscure issuers in raising capital among 
widely dispersed investors, underwriters and issuers devised a 
mechanism that potentially could overcome, by contract, what would 
otherwise have been limited capital formation prospects for these 
companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented 
measures to protect the integrity of the threshold requirement and the 
money-back guarantee feature. Rule 10b-9 makes it “a manipulative or 
deception device or contrivance” to sell a security on an “all-or-none” 
or other conditional basis unless funds are promptly refunded to 
customers in the event the conditions are not met.81 Additionally, Rule 
15c2-4 provides that proceeds received in connection with  
“all-or-none” or other conditional distributions must be kept in an 
escrow account, with funds to be returned to investors if the 
contingency does not occur.82 
2. NONTHRESHOLD CONDITIONAL MBGS 
The conditional element of the money-back guarantee could also 
take the form of the happening of some event. I refer to these types of 
money-back guarantees as nonthreshold conditional MBGs because they 
 
 81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (2012). 
 82. See § 240.15c2-4(b). 
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are not contingent on the reaching of some predetermined threshold 
condition. Deposit insurance, for instance, is a nonthreshold conditional 
MBG because depositors receive their deposits back upon the 
happening of an event—the failing of the bank—not upon the reaching 
of a certain amount in deposits or number of total depositors.83  
Although it has often been misidentified as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma,84 the bank run is in fact a classic Assurance Game.85 Imagine 
a bank that is in danger of failing (in a world without deposit 
insurance). Everyone would be better off keeping their money in the 
bank—their funds would be safe, they would get interest, and they 
would avoid the transaction costs of having to move their money to 
another bank. However, no one knows what the other depositors will 
do. If enough other depositors remove their funds from the bank, it 
would be rational for a depositor to remove his funds too. Otherwise, 
he would lose his entire deposit in the event the bank fails. The 
difficulty of determining what the other depositors will do results in the 
bank run.86  
Table 7 illustrates the payoffs in a two-by-two game of two 
depositors in a world without deposit insurance. Imagine two depositors 
who each have $100 deposited in AA Bank, which is in imminent 
danger of failing: if one more depositor withdraws his funds, the bank 
will fail. However, the bank has only $100 in reserves remaining, so if 
both depositors try to withdraw their deposits at once, they will each 
only receive $50. Depositor 1 has two choices: he can keep his money 
in the bank (K) or take it out (T). His choice is influenced by what he 
thinks Depositor 2 will do. If Depositor 2 keeps his money in, 
Depositor 1 will be better off keeping his money in and getting a net 
payoff of $10 (representing ten percent interest on his $100), rather 
than taking it out and getting a payoff of 0. If Depositor 2 takes his 
money out, Depositor 1 will be better off taking his money out as well, 
thereby receiving a payoff of -$50 rather than -$100. Both players are 
better off if they keep their money in the bank (10, 10), but because of 
the risk of a -$100 outcome if one depositor keeps his money in while 
 
 83. When a Bank Fails – Facts for Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, 
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). A 
related example is presented by home equity insurance plans intended to protect 
homeowners against loss in property values caused by white flight. See Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 2005–08 
(2000).  
 84. See McAdams, supra note 6, at 217. 
 85. Id. at 221. 
 86. Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
323, 359–60 (2011).  
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the other takes it out (0, -100) or (-100, 0), both depositors may choose 
to take their money out (-50, -50), in which case the bank will fail. 
TABLE 7 
NO DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
   
  Depositor 2 
  K (Keep In) T (Take Out) 
Depositor 1 
K (Keep In) 10, 10 -100, 0 
T (Take Out) 0, -100 -50, -50 
 
Again, there are two stable equilibria, (10, 10) and (-50, -50). 
Confronted with this Table, Depositor 1 reasons as follows: My 
estimate of the probability that Depositor 2 will keep his money in the 
bank is some number p. If I choose K, my expected gain is  
10p + (-100)(1 - p) = 110p - 100. If I choose T, my expected gain is 
0p + (-50)(1 - p) = 50p - 50. If I want to maximize my expected gain, 
I should choose K if 110p - 100 > 50p - 50. Solving for p, I conclude 
that I should keep the money in the bank as long as p > 5/6 or 
83.33%. Unless every depositor is nearly certain that the other 
depositors will cooperate by leaving their money in the bank, there will 
be a run on the bank.  
Notice here that unlike Tables 2, 3, and 5 above, the bank run 
Assurance Game presents a slightly different preference ordering. Each 
depositor does best if everyone cooperates and keeps their money in 
(10, 10). However, if Depositor 1 decides to defect and remove his 
money, he receives a higher payoff if the other depositor cooperates 
and keeps his money in (0) than if they both defect (-50). The worst 
outcome is if Depositor 1 cooperates and the other depositor defects  
(-100). In Tables 2, 3, and 5 above, the player who defects receives the 
same payoff regardless of whether the other player cooperates or 
defects. Hence, the bank run presents a more fragile cooperative 
outcome: in the face of uncertainty of what the other depositors will do, 
each depositor has an added incentive to essentially “outrun” the other 
depositors and get his deposit out ahead of the others. This arguably 
increases the need for robust, payoff-altering mechanisms such as the 
conditional MBG.  
Deposit insurance—which, from the depositor’s standpoint, is a 
money-back guarantee conditional on the bank’s failure—transforms the 
game from an Assurance Game to one in which the other players’ 
choices are irrelevant. With deposit insurance, if Depositor 1 keeps his 
money in the bank while Depositor 2 takes it out, Depositor 1’s net 
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payoff is $10 rather than -$100.87 Rather than facing the prospect of 
losing his $100 deposit, Depositor 1 can rest assured that in the event 
the bank fails, he will receive a return of his full deposit plus accrued 
interest, provided it is within deposit insurance coverage limits.88 
Deposit insurance obviates the need to coordinate with the other 
players—it takes the risk out of keeping the money in the bank even if 
the other depositor does not do so. In other words, “deposit insurance 
prevents runs because . . . participating in the run [does not] pay[].”89 
Table 8 shows the change in payoffs brought about by the 
introduction of deposit insurance. Because each depositor will receive 
$10 rather than lose $100 by keeping the deposit in regardless of what 
the other depositor does, there will be no run on the bank.90 The 
depositors will arrive at the optimal equilibrium point (10, 10).  
TABLE 8 
WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
  Depositor 2 
  K 
(Keep In)
T 
(Take Out) 
Depositor 1 
K (Keep In) 10, 10 10, 0 
T (Take Out) 0, 10 0, 0 
 
The depositor’s calculus no longer turns on the expected actions of 
other depositors. Hence, nonthreshold MBGs that are contingent on the 
happening of some event also may be effective mechanisms for solving 
the Assurance Game.  
 
 87. The converse is also true. If Depositor 1 takes his money out while 
Depositor 2 keeps it in, Depositor 2’s payoff is $110 rather than -$100. 
 88. Currently, the maximum coverage is $250,000 per depositor, per insured 
bank, for each account ownership category. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. IV 
2010). 
 89. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 21 (2000). 
 90. The source of the payout should be irrelevant to the utility maximizer—in 
the event of bank failure, a rational person should not care whether he or she is paid by 
the FDIC or by the bank. 
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III. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MBGS 
The analysis of Part II is, of course, oversimplified. For example, 
one cannot be certain that the conditional MBG will be paid,91 and it is 
not costless to enforce it. For both threshold and nonthreshold MBGs, 
the effectiveness of the MBG may be influenced by a variety of other 
factors. I discuss two such factors below: (1) the type of good, and (2) 
the characteristics of the guarantor. I conclude that the excludability of 
the good and the guarantor’s credibility of commitment are most 
critical. 
A. Type of Good 
In economic terms, goods can be public, private, or mixed. A 
“public good” is one that benefits everyone rather than just those who 
pay for it.92 Clean air, national defense, and public television are classic 
examples. Two key features characterize public goods: they are (1) 
nonrivalrous, meaning that one person’s use of the good does not 
diminish its use or enjoyment by another person; and (2) 
nonexcludable, meaning that those who do not contribute to the good 
cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits.93 By contrast, “private 
goods” are both rivalrous and excludable. “Mixed goods” may be 
rivalrous, but not excludable (“common goods”) or nonrivalrous, but 
excludable (“club goods”),94 as shown in Table 9 below.  
TABLE 9 
 Excludable Nonexcludable 
Rivalrous Private Goods Common Goods
Nonrivalrous Club Goods Public Goods
 
Conditional MBGs operate differently depending on whether they 
involve nonexcludable (public and common) goods or excludable 
(private or club) goods. Below, I analyze the relevance of excludability 
 
 91. Of course, if every depositor in the country were to simultaneously 
withdraw all of their money from their banks, the government would be unable to 
shoulder the burden.  
 92. Kollock, supra note 18, at 188. 
 93. Id. at 188–89; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 19, at 377. 
 94. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822–24 (2010). 
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on the effectiveness of the conditional MBG in solving the Assurance 
Game. 
1. NONEXCLUDABLE GOODS 
Conditional MBGs for nonexcludable goods—e.g., public and 
common goods—suffer from a potentially fatal defect: free-riding, a 
problem that has long been studied in the Prisoner’s Dilemma context. 
Imagine a group of state system faculty members who wish to raise 
money to retain a lobbyist at the state legislature.95 The faculty seeks to 
encourage contributions by guaranteeing that any contributions would 
be returned if a minimum target of $30,000—the amount needed to 
retain the lobbyist—is not met. However, any noncontributing faculty 
members would nevertheless benefit because any pay increases 
produced by the lobbyist would inure to the benefit of the entire 
faculty.96 Experimental results indicate that in such a situation, where 
the temptation to free-ride remains, a money-back guarantee would not 
be an effective means of inducing members to contribute.97 The  
money-back guarantee proves to be self-defeating: many faculty 
members assume that the guarantee makes it even more likely that other 
faculty members will contribute, making their own contributions 
unnecessary.98 In short, expectations of the money-back guarantee’s 
success undermine its very success.99  
The classic response to the problem of free-riding is government 
coercion or sanctions.100 However, numerous private mechanisms have 
been proposed, including enforced contribution,101 conditionally binding 
assurance contract,102 and dominant assurance contract.103  
The “enforced contribution” or “fair share” method stipulates that 
if a certain threshold number of individuals contribute to a good, all 
 
 95. This example is taken from an experimental study conducted by Robyn 
Dawes. See Dawes et al., supra note 37, at 1172. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 1171, 1183.  
 98. Id. at 1174.  
 99. Id. at 1183. 
 100. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 19, at 377; McAdams, A Focal Point 
Theory, supra note 8, at 1650. 
 101. Dawes et al., supra note 37, at 1172. 
 102. David Schmidtz, Contracts and Public Goods, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 475, 476 (1987).  
 103. Alexander Tabarrok, The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant 
Assurance Contracts, 96 PUB. CHOICE 345, 345 (1998). 
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others must do so.104 Labor unions and condominium conversions are 
two examples. If a majority of workers vote to be represented by a 
union, “even those who voted against unionization are compelled . . . 
to pay union dues.”105 Similarly, with condominium conversions, if a 
sufficient number of residents “contribute” to the apartment dwellers’ 
effort by withstanding the developer’s buyout offer, the conversion 
does not occur.106 Enforced contributions have been found to be far 
more effective than money-back guarantees, presumably because they 
remove the possibility of free-riding.107 
Assurance contracts, which make contributions contingent on some 
preset threshold being reached, have been suggested to encourage the 
private provision of public goods. “[C]onditionally binding assurance 
contract[s are] contractual agreement[s] to contribute to . . . public 
goods project[s].”108 Contributions are enforced only if enough people 
agree to contribute so that the project’s total funding produces a return 
that exceeds costs.109 Take, for instance, conditional charitable pledges. 
A philanthropist pledges to give to a charity or other organization if the 
organization raises a certain amount from other sources. For example, 
a donor agrees to a matching pledge of $500,000 to fund a new 
university research facility, contingent upon ten other donors making 
the same pledge. If the condition is not met, the university does not 
receive the $500,000 and the facility is not built. The research facility 
is a public good in that those who do not donate may still benefit from 
the good, a classic free-rider problem. 
Similarly, threshold pledge systems, which are functionally 
equivalent to conditional MBGs, have been successfully applied to fund 
creative works in the public domain. A public good—the artist’s work—
is provided once a predetermined amount of money is raised through 
individual contributions. Mozart, for instance, funded new works and 
concerts partly by requiring a threshold amount of contributions or 
subscriptions before the work would be produced or the concert 
given.110 Today, such websites as SellaBand.com promote the same 
idea: a band announces a set fundraising goal for a project, be it a new 
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 108. Schmidtz, supra note 102, at 483. 
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 110. See OTTO ERICH DEUTSCH, MOZART: A DOCUMENTARY BIOGRAPHY  
205–06, 212 (Eric Blom et al. trans., 1965). 
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album or a tour, and fans contribute online through the site.111 If the 
threshold goal is not met, the band does not produce the album and the 
fans can contribute their funds to a different project on the site.112 At 
any time before the goal is reached, contributing fans may withdraw 
their funds, but once it is reached, the funds are released and are 
nonreturnable.113 If the threshold is met and the good is produced, the 
artist’s work becomes available for all to enjoy.114 
One proposed solution to the free-rider problem has been to 
require unanimous contribution from all the players in order for any 
contribution to be enforceable.115 However, this approach suffers the 
drawback of holdouts. A single noncontributor could prevent the good 
from coming into existence at all. Economist Alexander Tabarrok 
proposes an alternative: dominant assurance contracts. If the threshold 
condition is not met, everyone who contributed to the public good is 
given their money back plus a bonus.116 Regardless of what the players 
believe the other players will do, they will have an incentive to accept 
the contract because of the bonus.117 In the SellaBand example above, 
pledgors could be induced to contribute by being rewarded with free 
MP3 downloads or other small incentives in order to discourage  
free-riding.118  
2. EXCLUDABLE GOODS  
In contrast to nonexcludable goods, excludable goods do not suffer 
from free-riding and are thus not as susceptible to self-defeating 
negative expectations. With both club goods and private goods, the 
conditional MBG could be an effective device to encourage 
contributions because it would not be undermined by self-seeking 
behavior.  
 
 111. See How It Works, SELLABAND, http://www.sellaband.com/en/pages/ 
how_it_works (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 112. See Jeroen van Doom, Believer FAQ, SELLABAND (May 7, 2010, 2:02 
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 115. ELSTER, supra note 104, at 42. 
 116. See Tabarrok, supra note 103, at 348.  
 117. Id. at 350.  
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Online coupon intermediaries such as Groupon and LivingSocial 
offer mostly club goods. They are excludable because if an individual 
does not buy into the deal, he or she cannot benefit from it. They are 
nonrivalrous because each person’s consumption does not affect the 
next person’s consumption or enjoyment (at least until reaching a point 
of congestion).119 Similarly, deposit insurance qualifies as a club good. 
It is excludable because only bank depositors can benefit from the 
insurance coverage. Although there is a larger societal benefit to 
avoiding bank runs and maintaining a stable banking system, an 
individual who does not retain funds at the bank cannot directly benefit 
from deposit insurance. It is nonrivalrous because each depositor can 
enjoy deposit insurance without diminishing the ability of others to 
benefit from it as well.  
B. Characteristics of Guarantor 
In addition to the type of good, certain characteristics of the 
guarantor can also influence the effectiveness of the conditional MBG. 
Below, I examine two factors: (1) whether the guarantor is public or 
private, and (2) the degree to which the guarantor can credibly commit 
to the MBG. I suggest below that the ability of the guarantor to credibly 
commit is more important than its public or private nature. 
1. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE GUARANTOR 
Does the identity of the actor—whether the guarantor is public or 
private—bear on the effectiveness of the conditional MBG? A public or 
quasi-public guarantor could have the advantage of inducing greater 
trust and confidence, as well as being easier to monitor and control than 
wholly private entities. But this is not always the case. Some have 
argued that because deposit insurance requires “authority to tax or 
create money to pay deposit insurance,” deposit insurance ought to be 
offered by the government.120 Private parties such as insurance 
companies do not have the power of taxation, so they must hold 
reserves to make credible a promise to provide deposit insurance.121 
 
 119. Vouchers for restaurants, spa appointments, haircuts, movie tickets, etc. 
are excludable and nonrivalrous (up to the point of reaching the threshold required for 
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they are excludable but nonrivalrous. 
 120. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 89, at 20. 
 121. Id. 
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Yet, the federal deposit insurance fund is not financed through tax 
dollars, but through “premiums that banks and thrift institutions pay for 
deposit insurance coverage.”122 Conceivably, a private entity with a 
record of trust and reliability could assess the premiums and manage 
the deposit insurance fund, much like a typical insurance company.123 
The success of innovative private networks such as the Certificate 
of Deposit Account Registry Service (CDARS) casts further doubt on 
the salience of the public-private distinction. CDARS is a program 
sponsored by Promontory Interfinancial Network, a network of more 
than 3000 financial institutions connected to allow each member 
institution to compete more efficiently.124 CDARS allows depositors to 
spread large deposits out among as many different member institutions 
as necessary to qualify for deposit insurance coverage.125 For instance, 
if a customer were to deposit $5 million in a depository institution, 
normally only $250,000 of that amount would be eligible for federal 
deposit insurance. However, if the customer were to deposit that $5 
million through a CDARS network member bank, the entire amount 
would be insured because twenty different network banks would each 
issue a certificate of deposit of $250,000. The FDIC has issued an 
advisory opinion agreeing that deposits placed through the CDARS 
system would be insured on a pass-through basis.126  
Although the CDARS network ultimately relies on federal deposit 
insurance, it shows how private actors can refashion and improve upon 
goods offered by public actors. One could easily imagine a system 
whereby reputable private actors such as Promontory Interfinancial 
Network could assess and pool premiums paid by its members to 
provide private deposit insurance. The success of private online 
intermediaries such as Groupon and LivingSocial is further indication 
 
 122. See Who Is the FDIC?, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/ 
(last updated Aug. 11, 2010). 
 123. Deposit insurance is technically more of a “guaranty” rather than 
insurance because “premiums are levied against the bank . . . not the  
beneficiary-depositor, and are not . . . ascertainable on an actuarial basis . . . .” 
Legislation, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 n.3 (1936); see also Guy Emerson, Guaranty 
of Deposits under the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229 (1934). 
 124. See Overview, PROMONTORY INTERFINANCIAL NETWORK, 
http://www.promnetwork.com/about-us/overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 125. See CDARS Overview, PROMONTORY INTERFINANCIAL NETWORK, 
http://www.promnetwork.com/our-services/cdars/overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 
2012). 
 126. Joseph A. DiNuzzo, Do ‘Pass Through’ Deposit Insurance Rules Apply to 
Funds Placed in the ‘Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service,’ FDIC (July 29, 
2003) (advisory opinion), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-
10220.html. 
2012:1137 Gaining Assurances 1165 
that the offeror of the conditional MBG need not be public, particularly 
when the good is a consumer item. 
2. CREDIBILITY OF COMMITMENT 
Rather than the public or private nature of the actor, credibility of 
commitment may be more probative of the effectiveness of the 
conditional MBG. I identify three elements underlying credibility of 
commitment: (1) capacity, (2) will, and (3) reputation. Does the public 
or private actor have the capacity or resources at its disposal to honor 
its commitment? Second, even if the actor has the capacity to commit, 
does it have the will or resolve to do so? Third, does the actor possess a 
reputational foundation that stems from its past record (or lack of 
record)? 
Although public actors are often perceived to be more trustworthy, 
the public nature of the actor does not necessarily imply credibility of 
commitment. Take, for instance, the Icelandic financial crisis of 2008, 
when both capacity and will were lacking. In October 2008, all three of 
Iceland’s major commercial banks—Kaupthing Bank, Landsbanki, and 
Glitnir Bank—failed.127 The government lacked the capacity to 
guarantee deposits because years of speculation had resulted in “the 
assets of the three . . . banks [being] 11 times greater than the entire 
$14 billion GDP of the nation.”128 When the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands demanded that the country stand behind the $5.5 billion 
owed to foreign depositors of Icesave, the online arm of Landsbanki, 
the voters (and the President) simply rejected the parliamentary bill 
committing to repay the amount owed.129 This demonstrated lack of 
will, combined with the government’s inability to honor its deposit 
guarantee, had far-reaching consequences for the government’s 
credibility of commitment. 
A similar fate befell Ireland’s banking system. In September 2008, 
the Irish government extended a blanket guarantee to all bank deposits 
and bonds, without limit.130 The government had the will to save the 
banks, but not the capacity. The three largest Irish banks had a total 
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balance sheet twice the size of the Irish economy, effectively 
discrediting the government’s claims.131 A run on the banks ensued, 
leading to a bailout by the European Union and International Monetary 
Fund in November 2010.132 
Today, the United States has the capacity, will, and reputation to 
honor the deposit insurance guarantee, but this has not always been the 
case. Both Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
had the same or similar resources on hand to deal with the banking 
crisis of the early 1930s, but differed in their will and reputational 
capital. Hoover believed in limited government intervention, telling 
Congress in 1930 that the road to economic recovery lay not in 
legislative or executive action, but in voluntary cooperative action by 
the producers and consumers themselves.133 James Sundquist argues 
that disapproval of Hoover was so widespread by 1932 that the election 
of an activist administration was inevitable.134 Whereas Roosevelt 
benefited in many ways from the absence of a record of failure, Hoover 
lacked reputation due in large part to his long record of ineffectiveness 
in dealing with the crisis.135  
Credibility can be undermined when capacity or reputation alone 
are lacking. A recent example of the loss of capacity was the February 
22, 2010 bankruptcy of SellaBand, the Dutch music startup that allowed 
fans to invest in their favorite bands.136 Although the company, acting 
partly as an online record label, “kept one third of revenue from the 
sale of released albums,” as well as interest earned on escrow accounts 
before the funding goal was met, it nevertheless failed to make a 
profit.137 The company survived in large part due to its acquisition by 
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German investors within days of its bankruptcy, and has continued as a 
going concern under new management.138  
Similarly, a loss of reputation can occur when the provider of the 
conditional MBG does not make good on its promises. For instance, 
Fundable.com, a website intermediary devoted to aggregating funds 
online for various fundraising projects, suffered a considerable loss of 
reputation in 2009 when it failed to promptly credit the account of a 
well-known author, who had used Fundable to raise money to purchase 
a new computer.139 Fundable had adopted the conditional pledge or 
conditional MBG model, promising contributors that they would not be 
charged until the money raised had reached a preset threshold 
amount.140 If the target was reached, the donation was collected, and 
Fundable kept ten percent of the proceeds.141 The problems began when 
users reported that even after they had received confirmation that the 
pledges had reached the target amount, they failed to receive prompt 
payment from Fundable.142 The negative publicity associated with the 
incident culminated in the dissolution of the company in October 
2009.143 Although like SellaBand, the company reinvented itself as 
Fundable.org and has survived under new management, the 
consequences of the company’s loss of credibility are still being felt.144 
These examples suggest that credibility of commitment plays a larger 
role in the success of the conditional MBG than the public or private 
nature of the actor. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding Sections have identified several factors that impact 
the effectiveness of the conditional MBG—the excludability of the good 
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and the characteristics of the guarantor. In this Part, I offer some 
preliminary thoughts on the larger implications of understanding 
conditional MBGs as a solution to the coordination dilemma. Below, I 
highlight the advantages of the conditional MBG relative to two other 
mechanisms—focal points and sanctions. I then analyze the substance of 
the distinction between incentives and expectations. Finally, I explore 
the application of conditional MBGs to two areas that have suffered 
from coordination failures—capital formation and the introduction of 
new payment technologies. 
A. MBGs, Focal Points, and Sanctions 
1. MBGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOCAL POINTS 
Recognizing that expectations can be changed not only through 
focal points, but also by changing incentives, can be valuable for 
several reasons. In certain situations—for example, where an individual 
faces the risk of a discrete, quantifiable monetary loss, or where there 
are added barriers to achieving or maintaining cooperation—law’s 
expressive capacity may not be sufficiently robust to move individuals 
away from suboptimal equilibria. Where the incentives are such that 
achieving cooperation in the first place is difficult, payoff-altering 
mechanisms may be particularly valuable.  
Take, for instance, the classic bank run. Not only can individuals 
quantify the amount of money they have at risk, but also cooperation 
may be more difficult due to the dynamics of the game. Although 
depositors know that they will all receive the highest payoff if everyone 
keeps their money in the bank, they also know that they will receive the 
second-highest payoff if they defect and take their money out before the 
others. This added dimension increases uncertainty and renders the 
cooperative outcome inherently more unstable and fragile. In such a 
situation, the expressive theory of law would appear to have less force. 
A simple pronouncement by the state that funds will be safe most likely 
will be inadequate to stop the run and solve the coordination dilemma. 
Indeed, history has proven as much. By 1933, despite desperate 
government efforts, more than 11,000 of the nation’s 25,330 banks had 
collapsed after millions of Americans had withdrawn their deposits.145  
Similarly, where there is real uncertainty about whether the other 
players wish to cooperate in the first place, threshold conditional MBGs 
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may be particularly useful. In certain situations, the desirability of the 
superior equilibrium may be more apparent than in others. Consider the 
example of an insurgency under a tyrannical or oppressive regime, or 
African-Americans during the civil rights movement—both of which 
have been modeled as Assurance Games.146 In both situations, the 
preferences of the other members are known. The challenge is 
countering the fear that enough others will not participate. In such a 
situation, the expressive presence of a charismatic and magnetic leader 
can be an extraordinarily powerful coordinating force.147 
Contrast this with an offering of securities in an unknown and 
risky company, or a daily deal offer for fly fishing. Players are less 
certain of the preferences of the members, although if enough  
like-minded players can come together, it would be an optimal outcome 
for those players. If individuals could be certain that enough other 
people have a preference for the offered item, simply announcing the 
deal could suffice. However, in the absence of such certainty, the 
threshold conditional MBG serves a useful function in eliciting 
information about whether enough people are interested to make 
cooperation worthwhile. In this respect, the conditional MBG 
mechanism proves instrumental in achieving initial cooperation. Thus, 
in situations of heightened uncertainty or where individuals face the 
prospect of some quantifiable loss, mechanisms that change underlying 
incentives and directly target that fear of loss may be particularly 
effective. 
2. MBGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SANCTIONS 
In addition, mechanisms such as conditional MBGs may be a more 
effective means than sanctions for altering incentives. The state 
traditionally employs sanctions to change payoffs so as to deter 
individuals from defecting.148 An example of sanctions in the Assurance 
Game context would be to charge a penalty of ten percent of deposited 
funds if an individual withdraws funds during a restricted period, such 
as during a potential bank run. But sanctions are costly and their 
effectiveness has been called into question in at least some 
circumstances.149 By providing individuals the assurance that they will 
not lose out even if others do not cooperate, conditional MBGs may 
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present a more effective or less costly alternative to sanctions. Not only 
can they be as easily offered by private as by public actors, but they 
also perform an inherently different function than sanctions. Sanctions 
in effect counter fear with more fear, whereas conditional MBGs 
counter fear with assurances. 
As noted above, in certain situations, such as where credibility of 
commitment has been impaired, conditional MBGs may not be a 
feasible or effective means of coordinating individual behavior. A 
deposit insurance guarantee from a country like Iceland or Greece does 
not possess the same weight—in terms of the ability to prevent a bank 
run—as from a country like the United States or the United Kingdom. 
In those situations, sanctions may prove to be a more appropriate tool 
for changing incentives.  
B. Incentives vs. Expectations 
Is there a real difference between changing incentives and 
changing expectations? In many situations, there is considerable 
overlap: changing incentives or payoffs (gains or losses), can change 
expectations.150 However, expectations can be changed without 
changing incentives, as suggested by expressive theories of law.151 As 
we have seen, changing payoffs alters the game so that it is no longer 
an Assurance Game; changing expectations does not.152 One way of 
conceiving the difference is to consider the extreme situation in which 
payoffs are changed so much that the individual no longer cares what 
other people will do. With nonthreshold conditional MBGs such as 
deposit insurance, rational persons should no longer care how other 
depositors behave, as long as the government can credibly commit. If 
the government cannot credibly commit, however, the underlying risk 
of losing one’s funds remains, and the depositor continues to fear the 
consequences of resisting the stampede.  
By contrast, with threshold conditional MBGs, where the 
guarantee is contingent on some predetermined threshold condition 
being reached, even after the underlying payoffs are changed, rational 
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individuals will still care how other individuals behave. With the 
dominant peer purchasing model in existence today, even though the 
buyer is assured against losing a financial investment, concern over the 
purchasing behavior of others continues at least until the threshold 
condition is met. Online coupon intermediaries such as Groupon and 
LivingSocial address this concern by providing a visible forum for 
coordination: anyone can track in real time how many others have 
bought into the deal.153 
Conditional MBGs may be viewed as mechanisms that alter both 
incentives and expectations. By removing, or at least minimizing, 
downside risk, conditional MBGs change underlying payoffs, resulting 
in a shift in expectations. Even though it minimizes underlying risk, the 
very existence of deposit insurance changes individuals’ expectations of 
what other depositors will do. Likewise, purchasers are more likely to 
buy into Groupon’s deals because they expect that other purchasers will 
be attracted by the risk-reducing features of the conditional MBG. 
C. Crowdfunding and New Payment Technologies 
In this Section, I explore the application of conditional MBGs to 
two areas that have suffered from coordination failures: capital 
formation and the introduction of new payment technologies. 
1. ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL FORMATION: CROWDFUNDING 
Conditional MBGs have been implemented in a number of 
different areas, including alternative modes of financing such as 
crowdfunding. “Crowdfunding” refers to the pooling of money from 
disparate sources outside of traditional public markets.154 The idea of 
aggregating small amounts of money from a large number of people has 
long been associated with charitable projects, but has in recent years 
expanded to general fundraising, lending, and capital formation efforts. 
On websites such as Kickstarter.com, Indiegogo.com, Sponsume.com, 
and ThePoint.com, individuals can pledge money to fund campaigns or 
creative projects in music, art, film, technology, design, and 
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publishing, among other fields.155 If the total amount pledged reaches a 
preset threshold, the project is “on”—pledges are collected and the 
project or campaign is developed; if the threshold amount is not 
reached, the pledges are refunded from the intermediary’s escrow 
account.156 
In August 2007, MyFootballClub (MyFC) initiated a worldwide 
Internet campaign to gather a minimum threshold of 50,000 football 
enthusiasts to collectively purchase an English association football club, 
Ebbsfleet United.157 In return for their investments, members were 
promised the ability to exercise control over the football club through a 
democratic voting process conducted over the Internet.158 The idea was 
a success. In January 2008, 95.89% of MyFC members voted to 
purchase a 75% share in the Ebbsfleet, making MyFC the first online 
community to own and manage run a professional sports club.159 
Using an Internet intermediary for the purpose of funding an 
investment is quickly gaining traction, challenging traditional notions of 
capital formation and investment. On April 5, 2012, President Obama 
signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act into law.160 
Title III of the Act provides a crowdfunding exemption to securities 
registration requirements, setting a maximum of one million dollars in 
crowdfunded securities that any issuer can offer within any  
twelve-month period.161 For investors with less than $100,000 of annual 
income or net worth, it sets the aggregate amount that can be sold by 
any issuer to the greater of $2,000 or 5% of annual income or net 
worth; for investors with incomes or net worth of $100,000 or greater, 
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 158. See History, supra note 157.  
 159. Fans’ Website Approves Fleet Deal, BBCSPORT (Jan. 23, 2008. 12:11), 
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the aggregate amount is set at 10% of annual income or net worth, not 
to exceed $100,000.162 The Act is widely anticipated to open a new 
mode of capital formation for small businesses and startups, which have 
struggled to raise funds from traditional sources such as banks and 
venture capitalists.163 The success of peer purchasing sites such as 
Groupon and LivingSocial suggest that incorporating a threshold pledge 
or conditional MBG component to these capital raising efforts could 
prove instrumental in encouraging potential investors to contribute. 
2. PAYMENTS LAW: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Another potential application of conditional MBGs lies in the 
introduction of new technologies. Payments law, for instance, has been 
plagued by obstacles to the adoption of new, more efficient payment 
technologies. Despite their notorious costs, checks continue to be 
widely used in the United States, with “[t]he number of checks paid in 
2009 . . . estimated to have been 24.5 billion, with a value of $31.6 
trillion.”164 Meanwhile, sophisticated chip-enabled stored-value cards 
and electronic money have failed to take hold, and early developers of 
these technologies—DigiCash, First Virtual, Mondex, Beenz.com, and 
Flooz.com, among others—have failed miserably.165  
One way of viewing the problem is as a coordination game among 
payment service providers, merchants, and consumers. Payment service 
providers may be unwilling to invest in developing new technologies 
lest their initial outlay of time, money, and effort comes to naught. 
Merchants may be unwilling to purchase expensive new equipment 
without some kind of assurance that a critical mass of consumers and 
other businesses will adopt the payment form. And consumers may be 
reluctant to embrace a new payment form until enough other merchants 
and consumers begin using it so that its benefits and risks become 
 
 162. Id.  
 163. See, e.g., Lee Barken, The Wisdom of the Crowd: Social Networking 
Meets Capital Formation, XCONOMY (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.xconomy.com/ 
national/2011/11/08/the-wisdom-of-the-crowd-social-networking-meets-capital-
formation/. 
 164. GEOFFREY R. GERDES ET AL., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS 
STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009, at 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/ 
2010_payments_study.pdf. 
 165. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 336 (5th ed. 2011); Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: 
Regulating the Competition between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment 
Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 692–93 (1999). 
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known and familiar. Though everyone would benefit from the 
introduction of the new payment technology, fear traps them in the less 
risky equilibrium of using existing, though less efficient, payment 
mechanisms.  
The coordinative potential of the conditional MBG should by now 
be apparent. A conditional MBG could be offered by a payment service 
provider to induce merchants to adopt a new payment technology. 
Perhaps it could take the form of a guarantee that the merchant’s 
commitment to purchase an innovative new smart card reader would be 
enforced only if a certain number of other vendors agreed to purchase 
the reader or a certain number of consumers applied for the new card. 
Any number of variations is possible.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have sought to demonstrate the coordinative 
potential of risk-reducing mechanisms such as conditional MBGs. In 
many situations where individuals have a shared interest in reaching (or 
avoiding) certain outcomes, anonymity, information asymmetries, risk 
aversion, and lack of trust form obstacles to coordination. Conventional 
theory assumes that problems of coordination are solved by changing 
expectations expressively. Little attention has been paid to the potential 
value of changing expectations through the alteration of underlying 
payoffs.  
This Article has attempted to highlight conditional MBGs as an 
alternative to focal points and sanctions. Because fear locks individuals 
in suboptimal coordination points, mechanisms that directly target that 
fear would seem appropriate. In diffuse, anonymous collective action 
settings where losses are salient and easily quantifiable, conditional 
MBGs, which alter underlying payoffs, may be particularly useful in 
facilitating coordination in the Assurance Game. I have suggested two 
characteristics that could optimize the effectiveness of the conditional 
MBG: the excludability of the good and the credibility of commitment. 
In many respects, this Article is highly preliminary; like any 
theory, it requires empirical testing. My primary aim has been to 
explore the immense potential of conditional MBGs in remedying 
strategic coordination failures. This analysis easily could be 
extrapolated out to other risk-reducing mechanisms in settings far 
removed from the consumer context. Consider the mutiny, a classic 
Assurance Game—an individual is only willing to participate if he can 
be assured that enough others will participate as well. Altering 
underlying payoffs can solve the coordination dilemma by destroying it. 
Combined with the inherent coordinative capacity of the Internet, the 
results could well be dramatic. One need only consider the role, still 
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debated, of social networking sites in the so-called “Arab Spring” in 
Egypt and Tunisia166 to grasp the potentially explosive power of this 
combination. It is a story of the empowerment of the individual as 
much as the power of the crowd. In closing, I leave the reader with that 
indelible image of the aggressive mob of bargain-hungry tuángòu 
shoppers in China. It takes no stretch of the imagination to envision 
how mass coordination driven by the will to get a good bargain could 
one day ripen into the will and courage to make far more significant 
demands for political reform and individual liberties.  
 
 166. See Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
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Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1379 
(2012).  
